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Tragic Errors and Politics of Guilt
The name Antigone, echoed many a time in the contemporary literature, is also 
the name of a theoretical error marking the same vast interpretative literature: 
to perpetuate the phantasy of collective guilt in the guise of an emancipatory 
pathos. In this essay I will put this claim to the test by tracing three—arguably 
representative—variations of the same error. I will not overburden my argument 
with long quotations from Sophocles’s Antigone, or with a discussion about its 
specific place in Greek tragedy. The play has been endlessly discussed in aca-
demic and literary works, and any new endeavour in a similar vein would thus 
seem superfluous. In any case a close reading of the minutiae will be beyond 
the scope and objective of this text, which focuses instead on the impact of the 
figure of Antigone on contemporary intellectual debate. In this respect my argu-
ment has been kept largely free of quotations from the play, and references to 
textual interpretations are confined to footnotes.
I. Meinhof: Sacrifice
Germany in Autumn (1978) was the result of a collectivist collaboration between 
filmmakers belonging to the so-called German New Wave. In one sequence of 
the film, written by Heinrich Böll and directed by Volker Schlöndorff, we are 
shown a national TV broadcast of the play Antigone that would be eventually 
cancelled for fear of the harm it might cause to the so-called “public interest”. 
The sequence shows the boardroom meeting of the state broadcaster during 
which concerns are expressed about whether Antigone could invite unwelcome 
associations with the fate of the founders of the RAF. The RAF, or Rote Armee 
Fraktion, was the outcome of a decade-long radicalism in Germany. The onset of 
the process that led to armed struggle can be traced back to 1967, when a young 
student, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot and killed by the police at a demonstration 
against the Shah of Iran during his visit to West Berlin. No policeman was held 
responsible for the killing. As a young revolutionary of the time, Gudrun Enss-
lin, one of the future founders of the RAF, wrote these words: “They’ll kill us 
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all. You know what kind of pigs we’re up against. This is the Auschwitz genera-
tion we’ve got against us. You can’t argue with the people who made Auschwitz. 
They have weapons and we haven’t. We must arm ourselves.”1 
The “we” here is a subject opposed to society as a whole, an avant-garde that 
will bring down the regime of the One Dimensional Man. In 1970, the RAF’s 
statement following the operation to liberate Andreas Baader from prison 
demonstrated the objective position of their armed struggle: 
Did they believe that we would talk about the development of the class struggle 
and the re-organization of the proletariat without arming ourselves at the same 
time? […] Those who don’t defend themselves die. Those who don’t die are bur-
ied alive in prisons, in reform schools, in the slums of worker’s districts, in the 
stone coffins of the new housing developments, in the crowded kindergartens 
and schools, in the brand new kitchens and bedrooms filled with fancy furniture 
bought on credit.2 
A certain shift is discernible here: the political organisation of social forces is re-
placed by a pathos which inadvertently underlined a historical rupture between 
those social forces and political organization. 
The armed struggle carried out by the RAF also highlighted the instrumental 
role of the mass media as the imaginary of the new capitalist society. The Spring-
er Verlag publishing group and its tabloid newspaper Bild-Zeitung actively ex-
ploited the actions carried out by militant groups, either for the sake of instilling 
fear or encouraging more security measures. Members of the RAF such as Ulrike 
Meinhof and Andreas Baader, though portrayed as monsters and villains, be-
came front page icons in an orgy of pitifulness, horror and excitement. The life 
and destiny of Ulrike Meinhof, one of the leading members of the RAF, stands 
out as a tragic figure of this avant-garde. When in 1970 she agreed to help An-
dreas Baader’s friends attack the prison guards and liberate Baader she was 
already a well-known journalist and an activist who had written extensively on 
the social situation of underprivileged groups in general and of woman workers 
in particular. Meinhof soon became a recognizable and fascinating face in the 
1 Quoted in Seán M. Sheehan, Anarchism (London: Reaktion Books, 2003), p. 108.
2 Ibid.
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RAF’s armed struggle. In the words of the Austrian-born author Erich Fried, she 
was “the most important woman in German politics since Rosa Luxemburg.”3 
Germany in Autumn was one among a series of intellectual attempts to re-enact 
the sequence of events that came to a close with the mysterious deaths of all 
founding members of the RAF at Stammheim prison in October 1977.4
Film theoretician Thomas Elsaesser took up the analogy between Antigone and 
the RAF’s actions, pointing out that it omits significant conflicts and contra-
dictions that the RAF was an attempt to solve. However, Elsaesser also recog-
nizes the fact that the whole style of an underground life comprising fast cars, 
communication and technical skills, and the staging of violent scenes on the 
streets, had an ambiguous aesthetic and political dimension.5 Thus, he identi-
fies a shared element that connects the RAF episode to the figure of Antigone, 
namely the act of self-positioning outside the law: 
Just as Antigone, by speaking from a position not above the law but outside the 
law, could become to Western political thought the ‘ethical’ subject par excel-
lence, because the place outside the law is for any mortal a non-place, so the 
RAF’s so-called self-obsession can be regarded as the consequence of their 
knowledge about the non-place from which they were speaking, doubled by the 
urban ‘non-space’ they were inhabiting.6 
3 David Kramer, “Ulrike Meinhof, An Emancipated Terrorist?” in: Jane Slaughter and Robert 
Kern eds., European Women on the Left: Socialism, Feminism and the Problems Faced by 
Political Women, 1880 to the Present (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 150; 
quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
4 Here it is noteworthy to contrast Germany in Autumn and Reinhard Hauff’s film Stamm-
heim from 1986. Germany in Autumn is a funeral where you barely hear Chopin’s March, 
a Trauerspiel that at any moment plunges into a bitter farce refusing to acknowledge that 
history as a matter of fact repeats itself twice; the figure of a pain-ridden self-deprecated 
and perplexed Fassbinder adds a tone of despair to the tragedy that is however the central 
generic theme. In 1986, the ambiguity of a shaken society seems evaporated. A cold damp 
angst pervades Stammheim in all its details including the photography. In hindsight, one 
may recognize this angst and the pending brutality permeating the photographic space of 
Stammheim as the forgotten precursor to the coming decades of cynicism after defeat; now 
the tragedy is played out on the side of the public.
5 Thomas Elsaesser, “Antigone Agonists: Urban Guerrilla or Guerrilla Urbanism?” in: Joan 
Copjec and Michael Sorkin eds. Giving Ground: The Politics of Propinquity (New York: Ver-
so, 1999).
6 Ibid., p. 297; translation modified.
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By the end of the essay and contrasting the televisual global/local “we” to a real 
“we”, Elsaesser concludes: “the very possibility of a non-ground would appear 
foreclosed by the sheer proliferations of (dis-)embodiments of a ‘we’ that alone 
can and should found a politics, by constantly confounding it.” Desiring sub-
jectivity, an ethical We and a non-ground outside the law, are components in a 
structure that Elsaesser identifies as being essentially at work in the tragedy and 
provides the bridge to the RAF’s action. Desire here is understood in terms of 
the recognition of a lack which materializes itself in the impossibility of a non-
place, an atopos, in relation to the law of the dominant order. For Elsaesser, this 
non-ground is objectively impossible but ethically justifiable. It is impossible 
because the “We” that the RAF strove for can only be the outcome of what El-
saesser calls a “cofounding”, whereas it is justifiable because the tragic heroine, 
Ulrike or Antigone, exposes the mechanisms of domination from without.
However, one might wonder why the space outside the law is so intuitively and 
unquestionably identified with the non-ground, occupied by a heroine in a trag-
edy, and how the impossible can offer any exposition of the really existing order. 
In other words, is the space outside the law a non-ground inevitably sealed by 
tragic fate? Or can this external relation to the law be conceived differently?
It is true that both Antigone and the members of the RAF share this minimal fea-
ture: they moralize the inconsistency of a certain mode of political representa-
tion. However, this moralization and its affective implications impede the possi-
bility of a conjunction of the social and the political. At the encounter with the 
inconsistency of a symbolic order, a pre-Athenian polis or the post-war Germany, 
the affective release that the tragedy occasions is nourished by the belief in the 
fateful hand of history. In one case, the figure of the tragic heroine, the young 
Antigone, functions as the screen that conceals and reveals the fate of the city 
state model run by a tyrannos. In the other, the figure of Ulrike Meinhof masks 
and exposes the collision course between the history of class struggle in Germa-
ny and the rise of West Germany as part of a new global configuration. A “sense 
of morality” is believed to precede the possibility of political struggle. Affect and 
morality become welded together. 
Affects are distributed as collective emotions of pity and pathos for the spectator 
before the melancholic heroine paying her debt; Antigone pays for a wrongdo-
ing, her father’s, and others pay for their fathers’ crimes in Berlin. Félix Guattari, 
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an author whose name has come to be associated with what nowadays is called 
an “affective turn”, resumes this argument in his article “Like the Echo of a Col-
lective Melancholia”, written after the death of the founding members of the RAF. 
Far from an investigation into the meandering of a tragic pathos, he contends:  
While the secret war conducted by the industrial powers along the north-south 
axis to keep the Third World in tow is indeed the main issue, it should not make us 
forget that there is another north-south axis, which encircles the globe and along 
which conflicts of an equally essential nature are played out, involving the pow-
ers of the State and oppressed nationalities, immigrant workers, the unemployed, 
the “marginal,” the “non-guaranteed” and the “standardized” wage-earners […] 
Like it or not, in today’s world, violence and the media work hand in glove. And 
when a revolutionary group plays the game of the most reactionary media, the 
game of collective guilt, then it has been mistaken: mistaken in its target, mistak-
en in its method, mistaken in its strategy, mistaken in its theory, mistaken in its 
dreams…7 
The non-ground outside the law and a tragic pathos are welded by guilt for a 
crime transmitted from one generation to another. In this respect, guilt is the 
unhistoricized ground of all history. The play shows this in a clear way in the 
opening lines of the tragedy: “In spite of the orders, I shall give my brother 
burial, whether thou, Ismene, wilt join with me or not.” Antigone, Oedipus’ 
daughter, living in King Creon’s household, tells Ismene, her sister, what she 
is resolved to do. But this defiant resoluteness is immediately neutralised, as it 
would otherwise surpass the generic boundaries of tragedy. The decision is ex-
plained as not originating in a desire for life but in a debt to the dead, expressed 
in the following words, which Sophocles puts into her mouth:
Loving, I shall lie with him, yes, with my loved one,         
when I have dared the crime of piety.      
Longer the time in which to please the dead      
than the time with those up here.8
7 Félix Guattari, “Like the Echo of a Collective Melancholia” in: Semiotext(e), IV, no. 2, 1982, 
p 105.
8 “Antigone”, verses 73–75; translated by Elizabeth Wyckoff in: David Grene et al. eds. Greek 
Tragedies (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
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The full closure of possibilities is condensed in these opening lines where a 
decision is announced in order to be annulled. With defiance neutralised as 
duty towards the dead, the heroine is bound to the law. The topos occupied by 
the tragic heroine is the ground where the law has already advanced its claim; 
there is no grounding possibility outside of it, only the war of all against all that 
awaits in that unthinkable outside. This fusion of subject and guilt closes off 
a possible presence of desires outside the dominant plane of representation. 
If it be true that a regime of representation collects and totalizes all meaning 
production upon its represented surface according to a set of imperatives, then 
a singularity, insofar as it is able to produce a historical divide running across 
the plane of representation, will be a political moment, only if its external posi-
tion, its “outside-ness” is a function of imaginable collective acts located in that 
divide within. This possibility of an outside, the space beyond the walls of the 
city, is exposed, albeit only as a barren, murky space, populated by dead bodies 
and blinding sand storms in the Greek tragedy. That is why, in the tragedy, An-
tigone oscillates between different discourses and finally ends up in guilt as the 
ground for reaction against the nonsensical decree issued by Creon. The error 
(hamartia, singled out by Aristotle as the central element in tragedy) in the con-
temporary encounter with the tragedy is the identification of the tragic figure 
as an ethically justifiable position, whereas this figure is made of that undif-
ferentiated coalescence of a decision and an alliance with the dead that serves 
the tragedy as a genre. Antigone, taken out of its generic context, perpetuates 
a theoretical mistake which plays into the hands of the fantasy of a collective 
guilt, blurs what Guattari called two axes of a secret war, and evades history on 
behalf of an eternal debt. 
II. Butler: Total Being
It is this eternal debt that brings us closer to an investigation of a second major 
theme in interpretations of the play; Antigone as the expression of a subversive 
possibility in regard to kinship structures and the order of patriarchal power. A 
classic locus of such a reading is Antigone’s Claim by Juidth Butler.9 The ambi-
tion of the book is clearly set out by the author: to expound upon the relation 
between kinship and “the reigning episteme of cultural intelligibility” and how 
9 All references are to Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
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these in turn relate to what she calls “the possibility of social transformation”.10 
Antigone is said to represent “a possibility that emerges when the limits to rep-
resentation and representability are exposed.”11 This possibility is then identi-
fied as questioning and problematizing the kinship structure. According to But-
ler, Antigone “does not conform to the symbolic law and she does not prefigure 
a final restitution of the law. Though entangled in the terms of kinship, she is at 
the same time outside those norms.”12 In other words, Antigone figures “the non-
human on the border of human.”13 She does not represent a sovereign anti-po-
sition in the political life of the Greek city, but “a chiasm within the vocabulary 
of political norms. If kinship is the precondition of the human, then Antigone is 
the occasion for a new field of the human, achieved through political catachre-
sis, the one that happens when the less than human speaks as human, when 
gender is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws.”14 Butler’s 
reading establishes a continuity between two heterogeneous standpoints. It is 
claimed that the figure of Antigone “implicitly raises the question for us of what 
those preconditions [of kinship relations] must be”, a questioning that takes 
place at an extreme limit, at the cost of suspension of all representations. In a 
second line of thought, Butler also suggests that Antgione’s claim, being rooted 
in an impossible position, opens up “a new field of the human”.
 
Nothing is less evident than this assumption of a transition from a negative, 
non-representable exposure of a patriarchal social order, to “a new field of the 
human”, which after all means a historical and political project aligned with the 
possibility of social transformation—unless one identifies or rather limits the 
scope of a constitutive political act to an unrepresentable representation of an 
aesthetic figure. More precisely, what is presented as a “possibility” is the poli-
tics of tragedy in a nutshell, the proof that the impossible is eternally excluded. 
The implicit presupposition is that a pure negativity, a non-representable—the 
uncanniness of the radiating beauty of a heroine before whom the kinship struc-
ture reveals its outer limits and the regime of intelligibility founders—somehow 
widens the field of new possibilities for social transformation. How can this 
wish, this fast track from negativity, law and guilt to social transformation, be 
10 Ibid., p. 24.
11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 72.
13 Ibid., p. 79.
14 Ibid., p. 82.
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conceived as intelligible? Why couldn’t the opposite be the case, that the play 
brings forth the closure of the field of possibility, as was probably the case for an 
Athenian spectator, who would deem the mode of governance in Thebes as too 
primitive and thus doomed to founder? Antigone was there merely a “vanishing 
mediator”, an affective remainder, a narrative device that arouses pity and fear; 
thus further consolidating the tragic but inevitable end.
To answer these questions, it is perhaps more accurate to revisit a more recent—
and seemingly more remote—figure than the Attic Greek one, namely the prole-
tariat and the demise of the political subjective position conveyed by this figure. 
The jump from a purely negative force outside social antagonisms to the half 
open field of new human experience is the effect of a political strategy. This 
strategy finds a firm ground for a politics of representation in the non-articu-
lated presence of a pure being, covered by a thin layer of dust; the dead body 
of Polynices lying beneath the walls of the polis. Contrary to this politics, the 
social body of the proletariat was the non-representable in the dominant rep-
resentation of bourgeois society; yet, this working class from the slums of the 
nineteenth century cities, in its productive actuality, through its irruptions onto 
the public stage, remained a social force. It certainly instilled horror and fasci-
nation, while at the same time retaining a productive collective force that negat-
ed the social order by dividing it along the lines of an adversarial social agenda. 
This negation aimed to invalidate the law’s unconditional power. In this sense, 
the proletariat functioned as a dialectical limit between the given social order 
and an imaginable future at the heart of the same order. The decisive difference 
between such a limit and what Butler calls the “less-than-human” is the one 
between existence and the absolute sameness of Being, this unalterable Other; 
the difference  between what a political act is—which is always impure, prone to 
failure—and the dead body of the fallen absolute. What is asked for—not only in 
Butler’s work but also in a number of contemporary readings of Antigone—is the 
transition to “a new field of the human” without any binding commitment to a 
positive and organized historical project. Therefore, we are left with an endless 
quest for something that has both the consistency of an Other and the fluidity of 
a force, the transgressive quality of an unspeakable sensation and the uncom-
promising solidity of a will. This spectacular entity, in its radical impossibility 
and its inevitable tragic destiny, fascinates; it is both a proletariat without party 
and a party without proletariat, the misfortunes of pure being viewed from the 
interval opened up by gender difference.
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III. Hegel: Dance Lessons
Most commentators of Antigone, sooner or later, stumble over the German recep-
tion of the play, from Goethe to Hölderlin, and also to Kierkegaard. But Hegel’s 
comments in Philosophy of Right and in Phenomenology of Spirit have set the 
framework for contemporary readings of Antigone. If existence is determined 
from the point of view of pure being as its less than pure appearance, as being 
indebted to being and guilty for carrying the defects of empirical life, then there 
is always a moral schema surrounding the settlement of the debt involved. In He-
gel, morality is defined within a range that starts from the immediacy of ethics 
represented by family, and its mediated form called the state, the instance that 
in its highest form, the constitution, is the realization of substantiality in and 
for itself.15 Crime and guilt are for Hegel rooted in the antithetical relationship 
between what is “The divine right of essential Being”16 at one extreme, and the 
public, secular right on the other. Hegel’s reading of Antigone establishes, first, 
a reciprocal relation in guilt; both Creon and Antigone violate the other party’s 
rights. The first violates the divine and mythical natural right and the second 
violates the laws of the city. This reciprocity is however a pure external relation 
between the two parties and as such the cause of the ulterior disintegration of 
the relation. Creon’s decree is viewed by Hegel as an intermediary manifestation 
of “the restored unitary self of the community”17, but this is different from the 
realization of this unitary spirit of community. 
The corpse in the play lying outside the walls of Thebes is the left-over of a his-
torical process through which the foundering of the external relation and the 
realisation of the unitary spirit of community will be later achieved in a univer-
sal constitutional state. Hence, even though Creon only represents the actual 
but limited expression of the spirit, still Antigone’s defiance against the unitary 
power of the state is qualified as a crime.18 The defiance itself is traced back 
by Hegel to family right, the necessary but necessarily supervened ground for 
the public right. The family right, the inner space of the family, will eventually 
15 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), § 165 and the addendum to § 166.
16 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit,  trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), § 467, p. 280.
17 Ibid., § 473, p. 286.
18 Ibid., §470, p. 284.
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fail, as it is by definition a right pertaining to pure particularity as opposed to 
the universal organisation of rights first realised in the state form.19 Hegel views 
tragedy as the stage where state confronts its own mythical and surpassed sub-
stance. The error committed by the higher unitary power is to overlook its de-
pendence on the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that at this early level only appears as 
its external counterpart and not its inner limit: “But the outwardly actual which 
has taken away from the inner world its honour and power has in so doing con-
sumed its own essence.”20 Creon’s error is the cannibalism of the state to con-
sume its own ground. Hegel’s definition of the Aristotelian term hamartia, error, 
is the forgetting of those waters of forgetfulness from which the state form once 
emerged: “The publicly manifest Spirit has the root of its power in the nether 
world. The self-certainty and self-assurance of a nation possesses the truth of 
its oath, which binds all into one, solely in the mute unconscious substance of 
all, in the waters of forgetfulness. Thus it is that the fulfilment of the Spirit of the 
upper world is transformed into its opposite, and it learns that its supreme right 
is a supreme wrong, that its victory is rather its own downfall.”21
 
Antigone’s figure is for Hegel a piece of mute substance that intrudes into the 
public self-sufficiency of the sovereign power. The interesting detail is that He-
gel, like Kant before him, views rebellion against power to be impermissible, and 
Antigone’s defiance, precisely as the tragedy intends it, is reduced to a metony-
my for the corpse of Polynices, thus exiled from the city. Hegel adopts this narra-
tive strategy when he writes: “The dead, whose right is denied, knows therefore 
how to find instruments of vengeance, which are equally effective and powerful 
as the power which injured it.”22 The dead is injured, finds instruments of venge-
ance and acts, and defiance is deprived of any social significance. Starting from 
the substantiality of a moment called ethics, Hegel’s dialectic of rights over-
looks the fact that Antigone’s defiance was in the first place a decision, clearly 
marked at the beginning of the tragedy, but only as an ephemeral moment to 
be surpassed by the tragic fate dictated by the genre. She may be siding with 
the dead, but if so, this would not inevitably entail a complete identification 
with the corpse of her fallen brother. It would not have been the case, if only the 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., § 474, p. 287.
21 Ibid. Hegel’s comments are related to verses 520–525 in Antigone.
22 Ibid.
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decision had been connected back to the social life in the polis.23 But such a con-
nection, a decision to disobey, is beyond the scope both of tragedy and Hegel’s 
argument. Tragedy conflates these two otherwise distinct moments, kinship and 
decision, divine laws and resoluteness of the deed, the ancestral duty and the 
right to rebellion; the adolescent girl who heedlessly defies the ruler and the 
ruler who does not see what even the blind Tiresias can obviously see. This dra-
matic moment confuses even the moral register into which Hegel tries to place 
her. How could Antigone, the representation of family duties, that undifferen-
tiated inner substance, act in such a resolute and self-conscious manner, while 
Creon proceeds blindly to the extent that his actions bring forth the tragic end of 
his state? That is why for Hegel the dead becomes an active agent and Antigone 
its prolongation among the living. What is overlooked is what renders the play 
coherent: the decisiveness of her decision remains indistinguishable from the 
unconditionality of Creon’s edict. This in-distinction is narratively supported by 
the guilt stemming from the filial axis of kinship structure. This is why Hegel’s 
otherwise powerful analysis of a moment of surpassing and sublation of the ty-
rannical sovereign power sees no further than Creon. Hegel adopts a viewpoint 
that Creon, by issuing his edict, had believed to be meaningful: that the dead 
can be injured, humiliated or is else capable of avenging his lot. If Creon’s act is 
part of a Greek tragedy, Hegel’s reading yields to the dead in a dance macabre. 
 
Returning to Creon’s edict, it would seem to state the following: “All enemies of 
state are exempted from being honoured by ceremonial burial.” In other words, 
the universality of the law asserts that any person who has insulted the state 
power is simultaneously exempt from being honoured. He is neither question-
ing nor ignoring the power of the gods or family right. In fact, he is maintaining 
the dividing line, the river of forgetfulness, between those forces and the secular 
order of the city.
 
The introduction of the universal articulation of law as the unconditional princi-
ple of sovereignty introduces a split in society. This is also consistent with Jean-
Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s reading of the birth of the tragic hero 
as a transitory figure and an outcome of the encounter between the heroic (epic) 
23 On Hegel’s theory of family and sisterly love, see Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, “Hegel’s Anti-
gone” in: Patricia Jagentowicz Mills ed., Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel (Univer-
sity Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 64–67.
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order and the introduction of formal laws in the Greek polis, namely the So-
lonian reforms.24 The deployment of a universal legislation projects its claim of 
unconditionality on a subjective scale and renders this latter tragic. Both Hegel 
and Vernant and Vidal Naquet identify a central conflict between a particular 
instance (family, the pastoral order) and the public articulation of the universal 
(public right or Staatsrecht). However, the main schema—Hegel’s or in a more 
historical variant of Hegel’s reading—assumes the inconsistency generated from 
inside the articulation of the universal, but dislocates the split. Rather than an 
expression of two different temporalities, the pastoral or family right on the one 
side and the posterior public expression on the other, the split that the tragedy 
deals with is a synchronic differentiation; a confrontation between a singular 
decision and the unconditional obedience demanded by the edict. The dead en-
emy was mistreated in the Greek city by being left unburied, a common Greek 
convention which stigmatizes their Persian archenemies and their customs. By 
issuing a decree and proclaiming something that could have been considered 
as a convention, Creon is doing something more than repeating the convention. 
He is declaring a punishment meted out to a dead body and demanding the 
unconditional obedience of the city. Antigone replicates that excessive moment 
implied by the decree and rushes into an exchange about nomos and unwritten 
laws (verses 450-470). She becomes the perfect Hegelian heroine, representing 
family piety and the ethical duties in the family domain (Sittlichkeit), thus as-
suming the guilt for an inevitable crime. The inconsistent particular instance, a 
particular case of the universal, is the decreed punishment upon a dead body. 
The singularity of the act carried out by Antigone is already effaced by tragedy 
as genre with its generic conventions of a preordained misfortune; and, final-
ly, the universality of the split running through the political order is recovered, 
transformed into individual debt in an affiliative kinship relation. 
The crucial theme in Hegel’s interpretation is neither the sister-brother relation, 
nor the conflict between the particular and the universal. Hegel’s reading in Phi-
losophy of Right upholds the thesis inherited from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 
that an act of disobedience in regard to any power is a crime. The legalism in He-
gel’s case is not the law of Thebes, but the future public right of a constitution. 
24 Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mythe et tragédie en Grèce Ancienne (Paris: 
Editions Découverte, 1986), p. 154. 
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Again here, the constant and unalterable element is the guilt that existence pays 
to the essence of being.
IV. Desire and Debt
When the law legislates, not upon bare life, but rather upon the corpse, and 
subordinates it to its universal sanctions, its unconditionality encounters its 
own inconsistency. A critique along these lines was delivered in 1953 by Lacan.25 
In his Seminar VII Lacan’s analysis of the play—in contrast to Hegel—does not 
evolve around the mediations in a dialectical movement from family ethics to 
the constitution of state. Instead, the point of departure is the beauty of a fan-
tastic screen presented by Antigone. In Lacan’s dialectic “the beauty effect is 
a blindness effect.”26 The coincidence of the blinding point and the fascinated 
gaze, a theme that Lacan would develop in more detail in Seminar XI, is deter-
mined by the way phantasy is constituted; the inevitably imagined something 
that resides beyond the law. For Lacan, Antigone reaches for this point, this 
thing that is supposed to be beyond, which is, in a dialectical turn, nothing else 
than the void.27 Hence, Lacan’s reading of the drama concerns ultimately the 
gap that is marked out by the tragedy between the order of existence and Being. 
Polynices’ corpse, the dead body, is the manifestation of the unique value of 
Being. For Lacan, the tragedy, by being true, excludes eventuality. It is a struc-
ture locked in a blind point through which Being is supposed to intrude into 
existence, and yet this point is not a site wherein a possible subjectivity could 
be situated. 
How can Lacan’s account enable us to perceive the place of tragedy in the con-
junction of the social and the political? Lacan’s theory of the tragic subject starts 
from the conditions of articulation of the universal principle. Evoking Goethe, 
Lacan underscores that Creon is acting in the name of the law and in the best 
interests of everyone. The issue is not that public law interferes in the private 
25 Jacques Lacan, Seminar VII. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 1959-1960, trans. with notes by 
Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992).
26 Ibid., p. 281.
27 Ibid., p. 279. Lacan’s comment on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is to be viewed as a phan-
tasy of self-generation, in other words a denial of being born.
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sphere but that the law demands unconditionally the obedience of all.28 It is 
this absolute unconditionality, inherent to the law in its formal structure, that at 
every turn contains a potential tyrannical decree. The cruelty of the edict aims 
not at Polynices, an individual in the network of historical relations, but his 
corpse, pure Being. Creon is not simply the representation of the social organ-
ization as Hegel has it; instead he becomes the instrument of a law that cross-
es the border and aims at the realm of pure Being at the very moment when it 
claims its unconditional universality. Hence, Antigone is neither an incarnation 
of the laws of the underworld nor a counter-discourse that belongs to another 
incompatible realm of existence. Only from the point of view of the law could 
she be conceived thus, because this is the only possible way for the social order 
to grasp “her senseless and bewildered nature”. While her action exposes the 
conditioned nature of law, Antigone, as a figure, perpetuates a guilt that seals 
the conditionality of the law.
Antigone’s arguments as to why she is prepared to sacrifice her life for a brother 
but not for a child or a husband is crucial not only because it takes up the kin-
ship structures pertaining to Oedipus Rex.29 Her argument, the uniqueness of the 
brother born from the same womb, implies a desire for absolute sameness. This 
sameness in pure being is the reverse side of the phantasy that upholds the ty-
rannos who in the final analysis is a primordial, unborn figure. Such is the apo-
ria in Oedipus Rex, the impossible position of the tyrannos as father of himself 
and son of no mother, the spirit of unity, which turns out to have other origins. 
The law in its formal and tautological structure refers to the autochthonic phan-
tasy—to use Lévi-Strauss’s term in his analysis of myth.30 It is a disavowal of the 
fact that the one-ness of the law, its unambiguous imperative force, is preceded 
by the social struggle of both women and men. 
28 Ibid., pp. 254–55 & 258–60. Lacan develops this idea further in an essay “Kant with Sade” 
in: Jacques Lacan and Bruce Fink, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2007).
29 The passage 904-15 in Antigone has been discussed extensively since Goethe. Antigone’s 
argument in the passage contains a historical reference to a story in Herodotus (3.119). 
An early explanation is given by T. J. Buckton, “Goethe on the Antigone of Sophocles” in: 
Notes & Queries, Oxford 33/1856, pp. 123–24.
30 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Study of Myth” in: Structural Anthropology (London: 
Basic Books, 1963), pp. 202–212.
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Antigone’s tragedy is precisely this innocent complacency towards the law, 
which excludes future alliances, invalidates imaginable futures. The only con-
ceivable option for her, as the chain of actions unfolds leading to the inevita-
ble collapse of the sovereign, is to succumb to the weight of guilt, assuming its 
validity and hence descending to the underground. Underground here is tan-
tamount to the absence of those social forces that would have separated the 
tyrannical exercise of political power from the affairs of the city. Antigone, de-
livering explanations of blood ties with the parents and the underground forces, 
becomes the effect of the law in its unmediated exercise: the debt to be settled for 
the committed error.
What does this tell us about the tragic dimension? More so than the misfortunes 
of fate, which is evoked in the play by its mythical name Até, tragedy is the 
mode of subjective existence, not per se, but from the perspective of the law. The 
argument I am advancing is not that the tragic dimension of human action is 
nullified by political decision, that a revolution as event does not bring forward 
a tragic or comic dimension of the so-called post-revolutionary era. The point is 
to separate the unconsciously hoped for state of being subject to tragedy from 
the tragic dimension of human existence. The desire that inhabits the action, 
beyond whatever the agent imagines, is distinct from the fate it realizes in the 
tragedy itself. Or in other words, the figure of Antigone, in her irreconcilable 
heroic act, is the figure of dissociation between act and desire. This logic is a 
well-known story; a price is set for a desiring act, culpability is monetarized 
and sacrifices harvested, by a church or any other instrument that extracts the 
surplus. The burden of this debt eclipses desire insofar as this latter aims at 
something behind a historically given situation. From this point on, three paths 
are thinkable and historically practiced.
The first evolves around a reasonable position; harmony and balance at the 
horizon of a closed universe, the purification of passions through catharsis is 
the preferred method. The new liberal subject, celebrating the pure monetary 
universe of debt and guilt, walks backwards along the same path. As the in-
nocence of living among deities in a perfectly closed world is long gone—even 
for the Athenian audience of Antigone—and despite knowing or imagining that 
we know more than ever before yet still doing as we did, this historical “we” 
necessarily traces the same path backwards, eyes open and affects adjusted to 
yesterday’s fluctuations of the stock market. 
116
dariush m. doust
Not far from this lies the second possible movement, its opposite but at the same 
time simple reverse: the cult of impossible pure being beyond all existence in 
the name of desire, veneration for the big Events of the past, vacillating between 
voluntarism and nostalgic defeatism; ultimately—to paraphrase Lacan—a case 
of necrophilia.31 
It is through the separation of debt and the act of desire that a third path can 
be conceived. It is neither the closed universe of the first path, nor the cult of 
the real, settling the debt by sacrifice, but a re-definition of the possible as that 
which is produced, created by human desires. This involves questioning the 
possible as an exclusive modality of being and detaching it from the old tau-
tological definition, i.e. the possibility of being and impossibility of non-being 
(Parmenides). It also involves defining desire as the act of production of a pos-
sibility independent of the indebtedness that is implied by the phenomenology 
of gift and apparition. This latter is ultimately about the indebtedness of the 
spectator before whom the world appears. Above all, this means to take part in 
and take sides in the process of desiring production.32
The crucial point is that there is no desire without the act of production and no 
act of production without an object of desire. Desire as detached from empirical 
objects and in a pure state is a will that sustains the Kantian imperative,33 an 
abstract freedom that leads into unconditional submission. On the contrary, the 
object as such, that which requires its subject, is an inconsistent entity that at 
each encounter is either less or more than the perfect self-sameness of the thing 
31 “The object, as I have shown in Freudian experience—the object of desire, where we see 
it in its nakedness—is but the slag of a fantasy in which the subject does not come to after 
blacking out [syncope]. It is a case of necrophilia.” J. Lacan, “Kant with Sade”, p. 658.
32 Undeniably this thesis follows what Lacan proposes in the last lessons of Seminar VII. The 
term desiring production is from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s, Anti-Oedipus: Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia (New York: Viking Press, 1977) which may surprise defenders of a 
certain academic rationale, but these references follow this simple principle: our interest 
in Anti-Oedipus is motivated by the series of answers that this work provides in regard to 
questions formulated by Lacan in Seminar VII. Desiring production is a term that here 
should be understood in a non-vitalist sense, and production as an act-sequence through 
which desire comes into effect and this effectiveness is desire as actuality. Thereby, we 
do not intend to equalize the Lacanian conception of desire and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of the same term.
33 See Bernard Baas, Le Désir Pur: Parcours philosophiques dans les parages de J. Lacan (Lou-
vain: Peeters, 1992).
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aimed at; desiring production invalidates at each turn the principle of non-con-
tradiction as the foundation of objective consistency.34 These encounters are 
the history of desiring production, the history of aleatory encounters, of love as 
tyche and of facing the lack of continuity in a causal chain.35 Lacan singled out 
the phantasy involved by dredging up a word from Freud, das Ding. That which 
is supposed to be beyond the empirical, given objects, a pure being qua being 
and nothing else. This pure being is the corpse we cover up and put in a box 
beneath the earth. There is no desire without the act of production and an act is 
effectuated when its subject assumes the inevitable inconsistency of the object 
that is yet to become—as a side product of the desiring process.
Emancipatory projects of the past two centuries may have failed in many re-
spects. The lesson to draw is neither the staging of a non-ground, nor the quest 
for a pure being allegedly outside the law, and least of all the circumvention of 
tragicomic dimensions of desire. Each of those options ultimately perpetuates 
the guilt that is the sworn ally of capital. Fleeing this guilt, either by withdrawal 
deeper into the heart of institutions sustained by the circulation of capital, or by 
turning the guilt into affective reaction to the atrocities of Thebes, only creates 
clever story-tellers and well-behaved spectators awaiting the final catharsis. On 
the contrary, there is no ultimate conclusion to draw in theory alone, except for 
the articulation of new questions concerning the changing conditions for possi-
ble emancipatory projects, all the while bearing in mind that any such project 
only can be thought and conceptualized within a social and political conjuncture 
whose lines are drawn by desiring production; thus as a historical possibility.
34 Jan Lukasiewicz, a Polish philosopher close to Alexius Meinong and Bolzano, provided a 
critique of the Aristotelian logic of the principle of non-contradiction as early as 1910. See 
Jan Lukasiewicz, “Sur le principe de contradiction chez Aristote” in: Barbara Cassin and 
Michel Narcy eds., Rue Descartes, (Paris: Collège internationale de philosophie, 1991), pp. 
9–32. I discuss this question with a reference to Freud and Brentano in a chapter in Dari-
ush M. Doust, Randanmarkningar till psykoanalysens etik (Daidalos: Bokförlaget, 2003), 
pp 35–70.
35 See Mladen Dolar, “Tyché, Clinamen, Den” in: Continental Philosophical Review, 46/2013, 
pp. 223–239. 
